ASN tactician Liviu Hen analyzes every of the three objectives scored in the USA in its 2-1 loss to Honduras, in addition to Jurgen Klinsmann’s formation and changes.
BY
Liviu Hen
Posted
February 07, 2013
1:02 PM
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It was a disappointing end result. It was an unacceptable end result. However the USA’ 2-1 loss to Honduras on Wednesday was something however tactically boring.
Particular person errors price the group in San Pedro Sula—and it was the identical particular person each instances. Heart again Omar González’s inexperience on the nationwide group stage confirmed, as he failed to shut down Victor Bernardez on the primary aim conceded, and he didn’t examine his again shoulder on Jerry Bengtson’s winner.
These two errors negated the great opening aim from the U.S., created by —if gradual—mixture by the midfield, a chic chipped by ball from Jermaine Jones and a relaxed end from Clint Dempsey.
Formations: 4-4-2 vs. 4-3-3 Hybrid
Questions surrounding the American lineup didn’t subside after Jurgen Klinsmann introduced his official group. With no true wingers within the beginning XI, the one certain factor was that the skin backs could be relied upon closely for width.
What resulted was a hybrid 4-3-3 or 4-3-2-1 formation with Jones pulling to the vast proper from a holding spot and Eddie Johnson advancing ahead from a barely withdrawn left-sided place.
Nonetheless, this alignment additionally gave Mario Martínez and Juan Carlos García house to work on Honduras’ left flank, which they used successfully. Each have been above 85 % in go completion, and Timmy Chandler regarded exhausted from an early stage from pulling double obligation on offense and protection.
Martínez was in a position to keep comparatively excessive, and Oscar Boniek García did the identical on the other facet, giving the Honduran 4-4-2 nearly a 4-2-4 look at instances.
Defensive Midfield Triangle
To counter Honduras’ skill to throw numbers ahead rapidly, the U.S. deployed a tightly clustered triangle of holding midfielders. Danny Williams sat deepest of the three, hardly ever venturing ahead, whereas Jones and Michael Bradley had a bit extra freedom to assault.
Jones ended up being the frequent attacking participant within the alternating one-man press, becoming a member of assaults late from behind Dempsey’s withdrawn central place. It allowed Jones to be on the ball very often, however he was too inconsistent to be a dependable wheelman, with solely 66 % go completion.
Nonetheless, he did reward Klinsmann’s loyalty with an help on the American aim.
Fast on the Counter
It was when Jones, Dempsey, and Bradley all obtained caught ahead that Honduras was probably the most harmful. The Catrachos’ fast counter-attack by the midfield ran by Luis Garrido and Roger Espinoza, who regarded to get the ball vast or give to a checking ahead early.
The sample was easy—both a fast dribble or go that bypassed a number of U.S. gamers directly and left the defensive position on the again foot. From there, Martínez and Boniek García might penetrate on the dribble, or the central midfielders might thread the ball by to forwards Jerry Bengtson and Carlo Pricey.
As he needed to be, Tim Howard was alert to a lot of the by ball makes an attempt and got here off his line to smother most possibilities earlier than they grew to become severe—besides one.
Dempsey Does It Once more
A little bit towards the run of play, the U.S. scored first by Jones and Dempsey. The ball swung slowly by the center of the sphere, gamers utilizing two touches the place one would have achieved simply as simply, earlier than Jones turned to discover a run by.
At this level, each Dempsey and Eddie Johnson went to make the identical run (inexperienced arrows), which might usually kill each other’s house. Nonetheless, due to the flatness of Honduras’ again line (yellow line), they obtained away with it.

Recognizing the play because it developed, Fabian Johnson well stopped his run (pink line), as he would have dragged Arnold Peralta, his closest defender, proper into the empty house Dempsey and Eddie Johnson exploited.
At that time, after the beautiful chip from Jones, all Dempsey needed to do was name Eddie Johnson off the ball and dink in a world-class end over goalkeeper Noel Valladares.
Second Ball From a Nook
4 minutes later, Omar González made the primary of his two goal-creating errors, though his teammate might have bailed him out on the primary one. It was one other spectacular end on that aim, as Juan Carlos García slammed in a bicycle kick, however the ball ought to by no means have gotten to him.

Because the ball was cleared from the preliminary cross on the nook kick, Victor Bernardez went to trace it down. González was closest to him, however as a substitute of following him vast to use quick stress, he left Fabian Johnson to trot out to Bernardez.
Not solely did Johnson not shut down rapidly sufficient as a result of he was too far-off, he stopped quick and halfheartedly jumped along with his again turned because the cross got here in.
Halftime Changes
Because the groups ran onto the sphere for the second half, Klinsmann adjusted his formation. It regarded extra like a conventional 4-4-2, however with two holding midfielders, which left a gaping gap in the midst of the six attacking gamers.
The concept right here was to have gamers examine into the house, discover the ball, and go to a different attacking participant elsewhere. In an ideal world, this may have drawn defenders out of place to permit for overlapping runs and gamers to maneuver off the preliminary run into empty areas.

It finally ends up trying one thing like a wheel when diagrammed, besides Williams held the defensive place relatively than making runs in. That shouldn’t have been an issue with 5 others to make runs and fill the house.
The brand new formation additionally integrated two forwards as a substitute of only one goal, so getting numbers ahead shouldn’t have been an issue. Nonetheless, the U.S. had much less offense and a way more susceptible protection when it moved to this new formation.
Bradley, Jones and Williams have been not shielding González and Geoff Cameron and stopping the Honduran forwards from discovering the ball whereas dealing with the U.S. aim.
The Last Breakdown
That proved to be expensive in the long run, as Jerry Bengtson ran in behind González to attain the late winner.
A pair issues went awry on this play: Cameron and Howard had a misunderstanding about who was taking the by ball, and González failed to acknowledge the second runner on his again shoulder.

It’s not as if Gonzalez didn’t know Bengtson was there; he was marking him nicely firstly of the sequence, when Maynor Figueroa performed the ball by to Boniek García.

Howard got here off his line rapidly sufficient that each one Boniek García might do was sq. the ball, though Cameron might have simply cleared it out for a throw. Cameron stopped quick as if he heard Howard calling for the ball.
That was when Gonzalez obtained caught ball watching. He was dealing with his personal aim, unaware of the place his man went. In the long run, it was a simple run from Bengtson to get in behind and a good less complicated end to cap the sport off.
Gonzalez struggled in his first World Cup qualifier, however he needed to be given his likelihood ultimately. The untested U.S. again line towards Honduras will be the one which finally ends up beginning in Brazil subsequent 12 months.
However that doesn’t assist proper now, throughout qualifying, when questions in regards to the shaky American again line have been answered unsatisfactorily.
Liviu Hen is a contract journalist primarily based in Seattle who contributes to the New York Instances Objective Weblog. Observe him on Twitter at @liviubird.
